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Abstract
A large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes
increase and often decline across rounds. This paper introduces a tractable form of risk aversion, called
aversion to price risk, and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price
risk. When there are informational externalities, there is a countervailing e¤ect which pushes prices to
raise along the path of a sequential auction, even if bidders signals are independent. The paper shows
how to decompose the e¤ect of aversion to price risk from the e¤ect of informational externalities.
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1 Introduction
Sequential auctions are a common way of selling multiple lots of the same or similar goods. How should
we expect prices to vary from one round to the next when there is no signicant delay between rounds?
A plausible answer is that we should expect the law of one price to hold; controlling for any di¤erence
between the lots, on average prices ought to be the same in di¤erent rounds. If they were not, if prices in
round 2 were lower than in round 1, then we should expect, roughly speaking, demand to shift from round
1 to round 2 until prices are equalized.
This simple answer turns out to have solid game theoretical foundations. As rst shown by Weber
(1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982), in the basic model with symmetric, risk-neutral, unit-demand
bidders having independent private values, the price sequence of any standard auction is a martingale (the
expected value of Pk+1, the price in round k + 1, conditional on Pk, the price in round k, is equal to Pk).
The validity of the answer, however, does not seem to be supported by the data. A large body of
empirical research has shown, in di¤erent settings, that prices sometimes increase and often decline across
rounds. Sequential auctions where prices have been shown to decline include wine (Ashenfelter, 1989,
McAfee and Vincent, 1993), owers (van den Berg et al., 2001), livestock (Buccola, 1982), gold jewellery
(Chanel et al., 1996), china from shipwrecks (Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2007), stamps (Thiel and Petry,
1995), Picasso prints (Pesando and Shum, 1996), art (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), condominiums (Ashenfelter
and Genesove, 1992), commercial real estate (Lusht, 1994). There is also experimental evidence of declining
prices (Burns, 1985, and Keser and Olson, 1996). Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) contains a general survey
that focuses on art auctions. While declining prices are more frequent, increasing prices have also been
documented. For example, they were found for library books by Deltas and Kosmopolou (2001), watches
by Chanel et al. (1996), wool by Jones et al. (2004), and Israeli cable tv by Gandal (1997).
An extension of the basic model generates increasing prices. Maintaining all the other assumptions,
Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that if the bidderssignals are a¢ liated rather than statistically inde-
pendent and there are informational externalities, then the price sequence is a submartingale (the expected
value of Pk+1 conditional on Pk is higher than Pk). There are informational externalities (or interdepen-
dent types), if a bidders payo¤ from winning an object directly depends on the signals (or types) of the
other bidders. One di¢ culty of the model with a¢ liated signals, however, is that it is not very tractable.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) was circulated as a working paper for a long time and only published in 2000.
In a foreword and bracketed comments in their published version, Milgrom and Weber motivated the pub-
lishing delay to the proofs of many of their results having refused to come together(p.179) and added
that some of the results should be regarded as being in doubt(p.188).
Ashenfelter (1989) informally proposed risk aversion as a possible explanation of declining prices. The
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most commonly used model of risk averse bidders (e.g., Matthews, 1983, and McAfee and Vincent, 1993)
assume that a bidder has a monetary value for the object, so that risk aversion is dened on the di¤erence
between the monetary value of the object and its price. McAfee and Vincent (1993) demonstrated that this
model of risk averse bidders does not yield a convincing explanation of declining prices. They studied two-
round, private-value, rst-price and second-price auctions, and showed that prices decline only if bidders
display increasing absolute risk aversion, which seems implausible. Under the more plausible assumption of
decreasing absolute risk-aversion, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist and average prices need
not decline. Because of this di¢ culty to explain declining prices with a simple generalization of the basic
model, they have become a sort of a puzzle, referred in the literature as the afternoon e¤ect (because after
a morning auction, often the second round takes place in the afternoon), or the declining price anomaly.
The rst contribution of this paper is to introduce a special case of risk aversion, called aversion to
price risk, and to show that without informational externalities a pure strategy equilibrium exists and
prices decline, when bidders are averse to price risk. An important advantage of the notion of aversion to
price risk is that it yields a model that is as tractable as the model with risk neutral bidders. Indeed, the
proofs deriving the equilibrium bidding functions are straightforward modications of the standard proofs
in the risk neutral case. In contrast, as we already mentioned, the commonly used model of risk averse
bidders is not very tractable.
Aversion to price risk is a useful conceptual innovation. It is a special case of the general model of
risk averse bidders studied by Maskin and Riley (1984). Contrary to the model analysed by McAfee and
Vincent (1993), it assumes separability of a bidders payo¤ between utility from winning an object and
utility from the bidders monetary wealth (or disutility from paying the price). A bidder that is averse to
price risk prefers to win an object at a certain price, rather than at a random price with the same expected
value. Budget constraints with costly nancing are a natural way in which aversion to price risk arises.
Suppose a bidder values an object $21, only has a budget of $10 and must pay an interest rate of 10% on
any amount borrowed to nance a price above $10: Such a bidder strictly prefers a certain price of $10
which gives him a payo¤ of $11, to a random price of $20 or $0 with equal probability. Because it costs an
additional $1 to nance a purchase at a price of $20, the random price gives the bidder an expected payo¤
of $10:5: As we shall see, a budget constraint is not the only possible explanation for aversion to price risk.
It is easiest to explain the intuition for why aversion to price risk generates declining prices in the case
of a two-round, second-price auction with private values and unit-demand bidders. The price in the last
round will be determined by the second highest bid. The crucial observation is that in the rst round each
bidder chooses his optimal bid assuming that he will win and will be the price setter; that is, he assumes
that his bid is tied with the highest bid of his opponents. This is because a small change in his bid only
matters when the bidder wins and is the price setter. The fundamental implication of this observation
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is that in choosing his optimal bid, a bidder views the rst-round price as certain (equal to his bid) and
the second-round price as a random variable (equal to the second highest, second-round bid). Optimality
requires that the bidder be indi¤erent between winning in the rst or in the second round. Aversion to
price risk then implies that the expected second-round price (conditional on the rst-round price) must
be lower than the rst-round price. The di¤erence is the risk premium that the bidder must receive to be
indi¤erent between winning at a random, rather than a certain, price. The result that aversion to price
risk generates a tendency for prices to decline, called an aversion to price risk e¤ect, and its intuition, is
general. It holds for auctions with more than two rounds, for second-price, rst-price, and English auctions.
It also holds if there are informational externalities (i.e., if values are not purely private).
An advantage of assuming statistically independent, rather than a¢ liated, bidderssignals is that the
model remains very tractable when adding informational externalities. Another contribution of this paper
is to show that a¢ liated signals are not needed to explain increasing prices. Informational externalities
alone, even with independent signals, push prices to increase across rounds.1 The intuition for this result
is the following. In any but the last round of a sequential auction, it is optimal for a bidder to bid so as
to be indi¤erent between barely winning (being tied with an opponent) and winning in the next round.
For a risk-neutral bidder, this amounts to bidding the expected price in the next round conditional on
barely winning. On the other hand, the winner never barely wins. Thus, with information externalities the
winning price in the current round conveys, on average, good news to bidders and raises the next round
price. More precisely, the expected price in round k + 1 conditional on the realized price in round k is
higher than the expected price in round k + 1 conditional on barely winning in round k.
The paper also studies the case with both informational externalities and aversion to price risk, and
shows how to separate the aversion to price risk e¤ect, which reduces prices from one round to the next,
from the informational e¤ect, which increases prices from round to round. The combined presence of the
two e¤ects may help explaining the more complex price paths, with prices increasing between some rounds
and decreasing between others, that we sometimes observe in the data (e.g., see Jones et al., 2004).
Most of the paper studies the rst-price and second-price sequential auctions with unit-demand bidders,
but Section 8 shows that the results extend to English auctions.
Before proceeding, I should add that there are other models in the literature that generate declining
prices. They include winners having the option to buy additional units (Black and de Meza, 1992),
heterogeneity of objects (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994, Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994, Gale and Hausch,
1994), ordering of the objects for sale by declining value (Beggs and Graddy, 1997), absentee bidders
(Ginsburgh, 1998), an unknown number of objects for sale (Jeitschko, 1999), asymmetry among bidders
1Stochastic scale e¤ects (Jeitschko and Wolfstetter, 1998) and uncertainty about the number of rounds (Feng and Chatterjee,
2005) may also generate increasing prices.
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(Gale and Stegeman, 2001), etc. I view aversion to price risk as complementary to the other explanations
given in the literature. The explanation based on aversion to price risk has the advantage of applying very
generally, without requiring any additional modication of the basic auction model. This is an important
advantage because, as the empirical evidence suggests, declining prices have been found to prevail even
with no buyersoption to buy additional objects, with identical objects, etc.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the equilibria
of the rst-price and second-price auction. Section 4 presents the afternoon e¤ect when there are no
informational externalities. Section 5 looks at risk neutral bidders with informational externalities. Section
6 studies the general model with aversion to price risk and informational externalities. It denes and
discusses the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational e¤ect. Section 7 presents a calibrated
example that shows how the data from empirical studies can be reproduced for plausible values of an
aversion to price risk and an informational externality parameter. Section 8 discusses extensions of the
model and the robustness of the main results. Section 9 concludes. Most of the proofs and additional
technical results are in the appendices.
2 The Model
There are K identical objects to be auctioned and N symmetric bidders, N > K. Each bidder has unit
demand. Bidder i observes the realization xi of a signal Xi, a random variable with support [x; x]: I
assume that the signals are i.i.d. random variables with density f and distribution F . Let the vector
x = (x1; :::; xN ) 2 [x; x]N be the prole of signals of all bidders, and x i the vector of signals of all bidders
except i. If i wins an object, the price he pays at auction, P , is, from bidder is point of view, a random
variable which depends on the bids of all bidders. If a bidder does not win an object, he pays nothing. Let
p be a price realization. Bidder is payo¤ when winning the object is
u(xi; x i; p) = V (xi; x i)  `(p): (1)
The function V (xi; x i) is the payo¤ or value from obtaining one object. Informational externalities
are allowed and V may depend on the signals of all bidders. When the utility of bidder i only depends on xi
there are no information externalities, or values are private. I make some standard assumptions: V (xi; x i)
is positive, twice di¤erentiable, the same for all bidders i, symmetric in xj , j 6= i, and increasing in all its
arguments with @V (xi; x i)=@xi  @V (xi; x i)=@xj  0: The latter assumption (which is commonly made
when there are interdependent valuations, e.g., see Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000) guarantees the allocational
e¢ ciency of the equilibrium.
The function `(p) is the bidders cost, or loss, when paying price p. I will assume that ` is a convex
function. When ` is linear, bidder i is risk neutral and the model reduces to the standard model (with
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informational externalities); when ` is strictly convex, the bidder is averse to price risk. I normalize ` by
assuming `(0) = 0:
A rst interpretation of bidders that are averse to price risk is that they do not have an equivalent
monetary value for the good on sale, but the goods quality V (x) contributes additively to the utility of
money. A second interpretation is that V (x) is the monetary value of the object, but bidders are nancially
constrained and must borrow to nance the purchase (e.g., see Che and Gale, 1998). In such a case `(p) is
the cost the winner incurs when the price is p. An example is `(p) = p (1 + r (p)), where the interest rate
r must satisfy the condition 2r0(p) + pr00(p)  0 to ensure convexity of `:2
There are two main advantages of my formulation of the utility function u. The rst is that it lends
itself to a clean and novel interpretation of the behaviour of risk averse bidders. For example, consider
a static, single-item, auction. A simple intuition for why bidders that are averse to price risk bid higher
in a rst-price than in a second-price auction is that a rst-price auction insures them against any price
risk; price when winning is certain in a rst-price and random in a second-price auction. The standard
explanation of revenue ranking with risk averse bidders is less transparent, having to appeal to the risk of
losing the object.3 As we shall see, the intuition for the results concerning sequential auctions is similarly
transparent. The second advantage of my formulation is tractability. The model with bidders that are
averse to price risk yields pure strategy equilibria independently of the degree of aversion to price risk. On
the other hand, McAfee and Vincent (1993) considered two-item, sequential, rst-price and second-price
auctions with private values, and demonstrated that an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exists when
utility is of the form U(xi   p) and it displays decreasing absolute risk aversion; that is  U 00(m)=U 0(m) is
decreasing in m.
It is worth pointing out that (1) is a special case of the utility function used in the general, single-item,
auction design model with risk averse bidders of Maskin and Riley (1984). They postulate that bidder is
utility when he wins an object and pays p can be written as u(x; p), and as an example of the general
model mention the case in which u(x; p) = U (V (x)  `(p)). Most of the literature on auctions with risk
averse bidders, however, has focused on the subcase with V (x) = xi and `(p) = p.
3 Sequential Auctions: Equilibrium
In this section, I present the equilibrium bidding strategies of the sequential rst-price and second-price
auctions, in which one object is sold in each of K successive rounds to the highest bidder, at a price equal
2While I will assume, for simplicity, that ` is di¤erentiable everywhere, note that when the winning bidder pays a xed
interest r for any amount above his budget M; then the loss function is convex: `(p) = p+ rmax f0; p Mg.
3A potentially interesting idea, that I will not pursue here, is that aversion to price risk on the part of some bidders may
help to explain the use of buy-it-nowoptions in online auctions.
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to the highest and second highest bid respectively. Recall that because of unit demand winners drop out
of the auction. In round k  K, the bidding function of each of the N   (k 1) remaining bidders depends
not only on his type, but also on the common history of announced prices and bids from previous rounds.
I will assume that at the end of each round only the bid of the winner is announced and I will look for
symmetric equilibria in which the bid of a player is an increasing function of his type in each round k. Thus,
in both auctions, revealing the winning bid is equivalent to revealing the signal of the winning bidder.
The bidding functions of the sequential rst-price and second-price auctions were rst derived by Weber
(1983) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) for the case of risk neutral bidders.4 The next two propositions
extend Milgrom and Webers results to the case of aversion to price risk. The proofs are straightforward
extensions of the risk-neutral case and are relegated to Appendix A.
Let the random variable Y (n)j , an order statistic, be the j-th highest type of bidder out of n. The
expected value of the object as a function of is type x and the k highest types of bidder is opponents,
k = 0; :::; N   1 will be written as:
vk(x; yk; :::; y1) = E
h
V (Xi; X i)jXi = x; Y (N 1)k = yk; :::; Y (N 1)1 = y1
i
: (2)
To understand the bidding functions in each round of a sequential rst-price auctions with K objects
we need to make a few observations. First, recall that in a standard, single-item, rst-price auction with
risk neutral bidders and private values, the bid of player i is equal to the expectation, conditional on
winning, of the items value to his closest competitor, the competitor with the highest signal. Second, with
informational externalities the expected value of is closest competitor j must be computed as if is signal
were equal to js signal. Third, in an auction with K objects, bidder is closest competitor is the bidder
with the K-th highest signal among his opponents; this bidder would be the marginal winner if i were
not around. Fourth, from the point of view of bidder i, the type of the closest competitor is the random
variable Y (N 1)K . Thus, in round k the expected value to is closest competitor, conditional on the closest
competitor assuming he has the same type as i and on the types of past winners is
vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
V (Xi; X i)jY (N 1)K = Xi; Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::; Y (N 1)1 = y1
i
:
Fifth, type x of bidder i conditioning on winning in round k amounts to conditioning on Y (N 1)k  x 
Y
(N 1)
k 1 : Finally, when bidders are averse to price risk it is useful to think of L = `
 
S1k (x; :::)

as the bid
loss associated with the bid S1k (x; :::): Dening  = `
 1 as the inverse of the loss function `, (L) is the
bid that generates a bid loss L to the bidder. The function  is strictly increasing and concave.
4Milgrom and Weber (1982) worked with a¢ liated types. As they say in the foreword added to the published version,
because of a¢ liation their proofs have to be considered in doubt; see Mezzetti et al. (2008), for some recent progress.
6
Proposition 1 In each round k of a sequential rst-price auction, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x
is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest competitor conditional on (i) the closest competitor
assuming that he has the same signal as bidder i, (ii) the history of the winning types prior to round k,
and (iii) bidder i winning in round k:
S1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1
i
:
S1k is an increasing function of all its arguments when there are informational externalities. With
private values vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::) = V

Y
(N 1)
K

and S1k does not depend on the types of the
winners of previous rounds (equivalently, it does not depend on the price history).
To understand the bidding functions in a sequential second-price auction, say that bidder i is pivotal
in round k if he has the same signal as the k-th highest of his opponents, and hence he is in a tie with one
opponent as the remaining bidder with the highest signal. The di¤erence between the bids in a rst-price
and a second-price auction is that in a second-price auction a bidder assumes that he is pivotal, rather
than assuming he is just the winner. Thus, for example, in a single-item, second-price auction with private
values and risk neutral bidders, bidder is bid is equal to his expected value for the object or, equivalently,
the expected value of the object to his closest opponent, conditional on being pivotal.
Proposition 2 In each round k of a sequential second-price auction, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x
is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest competitor conditional on (i) the closest competitor
assuming that he has the same signal as bidder i, (ii) the history of the winning types prior to round k,
and (iii) bidder i being pivotal in round k:
S2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)jY (N 1)k = x
i
:
Note that with a single object, K = 1, private values and risk neutrality, the formulas in Propositions
1 and 2 reduce to the well known bid functions S11 (x) = E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
1

jY (N 1)1  x
i
and S21 (x) =
E
h
V

Y
(N 1)
1

jY (N 1)1 = x
i
= V (x).
I conclude this section with a remark. In a rst-price auction, announcing the bid of the winner, as I
have assumed, is equivalent to announcing the selling price, the standard practice in real auctions. This
is not so in a second-price auction, where announcing the winning price amounts to revealing the type of
the highest loser, a bidder who will be present in the next round. I will study the case of announcing the
winning price in a sequential second-price auction in Section 8.
4 The Afternoon E¤ect
In this section, I assume that there are no informational externalities. With private values, is payo¤ when
winning the object is V (xi); to simplify notation, I will renormalize the type space and write V (xi) = xi:
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The next proposition shows that declining prices are a natural consequence of aversion to price risk.
Proposition 3 When there are no informational externalities, the price sequences in a sequential rst-
price and in a sequential second-price auction are a supermartingale: The expected price in round k + 1
conditional on the price in round k is lower than the price in round k.
Proof. If there are no informational externalities, then announcing either the winning bids or prices has
no direct e¤ect on the bidding functions. Consider rst a sequential rst-price auction. Given private
values, it is
S1k (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k  x
i
:
Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. Then it must be PS1k = 
S1
k (x) and Y
(N 1)
k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 :
It follows that
E

PS1k+1jPS1k

= E

PS1k+1jS1k (x)

= E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )jY (N 1)k  x
i
= E
h


`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x
i
< 

E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x
i
= 

E
h
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k+1  Y (N 1)k
i
jY (N 1)k  x
i
= 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k  x
i
= S1k (x)
= PS1k ;
where the inequality follows from Jensens inequality, given that  is a strictly concave function. This
shows that the price sequence in a sequential rst-price auction is a supermartingale.
Consider now a sequential second-price auction. Given private values, it is
S2k (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = x
i
Suppose in round k the winner is the bidder with signal Y (N 1)k ; and bidder i of type x is the price setter;
that is, PS2k = 
S2
k (x). In round k + 1, bidder i of type x wins the auction, and the price setter is the
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bidder with the signal Y (N 1)k+1 . It follows that
E

PS2k+1jPS2k

= E

PS2k+1jS2k (x)

= E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )jY (N 1)k = x
i
= E
h


`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )

jY (N 1)k = x
i
< 

E
h
`

S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 )

jY (N 1)k = x
i
= 

E
h
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K )jY (N 1)k+1 = Y (N 1)k+1
i
jY (N 1)k = x
i
= 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K )jY (N 1)k = x
i
= S2k (x)
= PS2k :
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a supermartingale.
The intuition for the afternoon e¤ect is essentially the same in a rst-price and a second-price sequential
auction. In each round before the last, conditional on having the highest remaining type and being the
price setter, a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning now and winning in the next round.5 But if a
bidder is the price setter, then he knows the current price, while next rounds price is random. Because of
aversion to price risk, next rounds expected price must then be lower than the price now. The di¤erence is
the risk premium the bidder must receive to be indi¤erent between the certain price now and the random
price in the next round.
To understand this intuition in more detail, consider round k < K of the second-price auction. Suppose
type x of bidder i has lost all preceding auctions. Suppose also that in round k bidder x considers raising
his bid by a small amount " above S2k (x). This will only make a di¤erence if, after the deviation, he wins
in round k, while he would have otherwise lost and won in round k + 1. For this to happen, it must be
that Y (N 1)k ' x; that is, we must be in the event in which bidder i with signal x is at the margin between
winning and losing in round k (i.e., he must be pivotal, his signal must be tied with the signal of another
bidder). Conditional on this event, the marginal cost of the deviation is the loss incurred in period k when
bidding according to the deviation,
`(S2k (x) + ");
while the marginal benet is the expected loss avoided in period k + 1;
E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ))jY (N 1)k ' x  Y (N 1)k 1 )
i
:
5 In a sequential rst-price auction, if a bidder has the highest signal in round k and he bids according to the equilbrium
bidding function, then he is automatically the price setter. In a sequential second-price auction, conditioning on the highest-
signal bidder also being the price setter amounts to requiring that his signal is tied with the signal of another bidder (i.e., the
bidder is pivotal).
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Equating marginal cost and marginal benet (and sending " to zero) gives the following indi¤erence con-
dition (see equation (23) in Appendix A):
`(S2k (x)) = E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ))jY (N 1)k = x)
i
:
The indi¤erence condition says that the certain loss when winning in period k at a price S2k (x) must be
equal to the expected loss when winning in period k + 1. Since bidders are averse to price risk, it must
then be the case that the expected price in round k + 1 is less than the price S2k (x) in round k: For the
marginal bidder to be indi¤erent between winning at a certain price now, or at an uncertain price in the
next round, it must be the case that the next rounds expected price (conditional on the current price) is
lower than the current price. Hence prices must decline from one period to the next.
Now consider a sequential rst-price auction. Suppose bidder i wins in round k if he bids as a type
x; that is, suppose Y (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 : Bidder i can also always bid so low so as to lose in round k.
With a losing bid, bidder i discovers the value of Y (N 1)k (the signal of the winner when bidder i bids low).
Bidder i can then win for sure in round k + 1 by bidding S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ) (i.e., by bidding as if his type
were Y (N 1)k ). The indi¤erence condition for sequential rst-price auctions states that bidder i must be
indi¤erent between winning in round k and in round k + 1 (see equation (15) in Appendix A):
`(S1k (x)) = E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k )

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1
i
:
The left hand side is the certain loss associated with the period k price; the right hand side is the expected
loss associated with the random price in period k+ 1. Thus the price sequence must also be decreasing in
a sequential rst-price auction.
Another way to understand Proposition 3 is the following. We know from Weber (1983) and Milgrom
and Weber (1982) that if bidders are risk neutral and values are private, then the price sequence is a
martingale. When bidders are averse to price risk, the loss `(p) plays the same role for a bidder as the
price p in the case of risk neutrality. Hence, the loss sequence associated with the price setting bids will
be a martingale. Since ` is a convex function, the price sequence must be a supermartingale; that is, price
declines over time.
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5 The E¤ect of Informational Externalities
In the literature on sequential auctions with unit demand, an increasing price sequence has only been
derived in the model with a¢ liated signals by Milgrom and Weber (1982).6 ;7 In this section, I show
that a¢ liated signals are not needed to generate increasing price sequences. With independent signals,
risk neutral bidders (i.e., ` is the identity function) and informational externalities, prices increase along
the equilibrium path of a sequential auction. The price sequence is a martingale only if there are no
informational externality (i.e., in the common terminology, values are private).
Proposition 4 In a sequential rst-price and in a sequential second-price auction with announcement
of the winning bids, if bidders are risk neutral and there are informational externalities, then the price
sequence is a submartingale: The expected price in round k+1 conditional on the price in round k is higher
than the price in round k.
Proof. Recall that ` and  coincide with the identity function. Consider rst a sequential rst-price
auction. Suppose type x of bidder i wins auction k < K. It must be Y (N 1)k  x < yk 1 < ::: < y1, and
PS1k = 
S1
k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1
i
: It follows that
E

PS1k+1jPS1k

= E

PS1k+1jS1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1)

(3)
= E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;x; yk 1; ::; y1)jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1; :::
i
> E
h
S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::; y1)jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1; :::
i
= E
h
vk+1

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1; :::
i
= E
h
vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1; :::
i
= S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)
= PS1k ;
where the inequality follows from S1k+1() being a strictly increasing function of all its arguments and
Y
(N 1)
k  x. Thus, the price sequence in a sequential rst-price auction is a submartingale.
6However, as I pointed out in the introduction, in the published version of their working paper, Milgrom and Weber (1982,
2000) acknowledge that the proofs of their results with a¢ liated signals should be regarded as being in doubt (p. 188).
Mezzetti et al. (2008) were able to provide a proof for the case of a sequential second-price auction in which the winning bids
are announced.
7When bidders have multi-unit demand, many new technical issues arise and only special versions of the model have been
solved. For example, in a repeated game set-up with common-values, one informed and one uninformed player, Jamison and
Horner (2008) have shown that the price jumps up after a bid of the informed player reveals that the common value is high.
Virag (2007) obtains a similar conclusion assuming that bids are not revealed, but the value of the item is discovered by the
uninformed party after winning once.
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Now consider a sequential second-price auction. Suppose that in round k the winner is the bidder with
signal Y (N 1)k , and bidder i of type x is the price setter; that is, P
S2
k = 
S2
k (x; yk 1; :::; y1): In round k+1,
bidder i of type x wins the auction, and the price setter is the bidder with signal Y (N 1)k+1 . It follows that
E

PS2k+1jPS2k

= E

PS2k+1jS2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)

(4)
= E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k+1  x  Y (N 1)k  yk 1; ::
i
> E
h
S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; ::)jY (N 1)k = x  yk 1; ::
i
= E
h
E
h
vk+1(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)jY (N 1)k+1 = Y (N 1)k+1
i
jY (N 1)k = x
i
= E
h
vk+1(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)jY (N 1)k = x
i
= E
h
vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)jY (N 1)k = x
i
= S2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)
= PS2k :
Thus, the price sequence in a sequential second-price auction is also a submartingale.
To see why with informational externalities and risk neutral bidders prices tend to increase from one
round to the next even in the case of independent signals, consider a sequential second-price auction (the
reasoning for a rst-price auction is similar). First, recall that in each round k, the price is equal to the bid
of the loser with the highest signal. Second, observe that in each round k before the last, the price-setter,
as any other bidder, chooses a bid that makes him indi¤erent between winning and winning in the next
round, conditional on being pivotal in round k; that is, conditional on being tied with the winner as the
remaining bidder with the highest signal. Thus, the price in round k is equal to the expected price in the
next round conditional on the the price-setter in round k being pivotal. With informational externalities,
this is lower than the next round expected price conditional on the current price. This is because with
probability one the price-setter is not pivotal; that is, round k winner has a higher, not the same, signal
than the price-setter, and the value of an object directly depends in a positive way on the signals of all
bidders. Hence price tends to increase over time.
6 Aversion to Price Risk and Informational Externalities: E¤ect De-
composition
While aversion to price risk pushes prices to decline over time, informational externalities introduce a ten-
dency for prices to increase. If bidders are both averse to price risk and there are informational externalities,
it is possible to decompose the two countervailing e¤ects on the price sequence.
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Recall that, given a bid loss L, we can think of  (L) as the bid, or implicit price, that generates L: Let
PSjk be the price in round k of a rst-price (for j = 1) or a second-price (for j = 2) auction. In dening
the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality e¤ect, we always condition on the price
in round k: This amount to conditioning on the types yk 1; :::; y1 of the winners in the rst k   1 rounds
and on the type x of the price setter in round k:
We dene the aversion to price risk e¤ect as the di¤erence between the price expected in round k + 1
and the implicit price associated with the expected loss in round k + 1:
ASjk+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = E
h
PSjk+1jPSjk
i
  

E
h
`

PSjk+1

jPSjk
i
:
The aversion to price risk e¤ect is non-positive. It is immediate that in the case of risk neutrality ASjk+1 = 0:
That ASjk+1 () < 0 when bidders are averse to price risk follows immediately from the convexity of `, which
implies that `

E
h
PSjk+1jPSjk
i
< E
h
`

PSjk+1

jPSjk
i
:
We dene the informational externality e¤ect as the di¤erence between the implicit price associated
with the expected loss in round k + 1 and the implicit price associated with the loss in round k:
ISjk+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) = 

E
h
`

PSjk+1

jPSjk
i
  

`

PSjk

The informational externality e¤ect is zero with private values and strictly positive with informational
externalities. This follows from the bid loss sequence being a martingale with private values and a sub-
martingale with informational externalities; that is, E
h
`

PSjk+1

jPSjk
i
 `

PSjk

with strict inequality
when there are informational externalities.8
The next proposition, whose proof follows immediately from the denitions of ASjk+1 and I
Sj
k+1, shows
that in both sequential auctions the expected price in round k + 1, conditional on the price in round k; is
equal to the sum of the price in round k, the aversion to price risk e¤ect, and the informational externality
e¤ect.
Proposition 5 Suppose the price setter in round k has signal x and the history of winners signals up
to round k   1 is yk 1; :::; y1: In the sequential rst-price auction (j = 1) and the sequential second-price
auction (j = 2) with announcement of the winning bids we have:
E
h
PSjk+1jPSjk
i
= PSjk +A
Sj
k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1) + I
Sj
k+1(x; yk 1; :::; y1): (5)
Furthermore, it is ASjk+1() < 0 if bidders are averse to price risk and ASjk+1() = 0 if bidders are risk neutral;
it is ISjk+1 () > 0 if there are informational externalities and ISjk+1 () = 0 if there are private values.
8The proof of this statement mirrors the proof of Proposition 4. The only modication that is needed is to replace PSjk+1;
PSjk ; 
Sj
k+1; and 
Sj
k in (3) and (4) with `

PSjk+1

; `

PSjk

; `

Sjk+1

and `

Sjk

:
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7 A Calibrated Example
Can aversion to price risk explain the declining price sequences we observe in the data? What is the
degree of aversion to price risk that is needed? May prices decline even with informational externalities?
This section provides some answers to these questions. I introduce a simple parametric example, and
show that its predictions match the data from a sample of empirical studies, for reasonable specications
of the parameters. The empirical reference points for the discussion in this section are the papers of
Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1993) on sequential (mostly two-round) auctions of identical
bottles of wine sold in equal lot sizes. Ashenfelters (1989) data set included auctions between August
1985 and December 1987 in four di¤erent location (Christiess London and Chicago, Sothebys London and
Butterselds San Francisco). McAfee and Vincent (1993) looked at auctions held at Christiess in Chicago
in 1987. They both found evidence of declining prices; the price in the second auction was twice more
likely to decrease than to increase. The average price ratio P2=P 1 they found is displayed in Table 1.
Mean Ratio P2=P1
Ashenfelter (1989): Christiess London .9943
Ashenfelter (1989): Sothebys London .9875
Ashenfelter (1989): Christiess Chicago .9884
Ashenfelter (1989): Butterelds San Francisco .9663
McAfee and Vincent (1993): Christiess Chicago .9922
Table 1: Price ratio in the data
I will make the following simplifying assumptions to the model. The quality valuation of an object to
bidder i is xi + b
P
j 6=i xj ; with b 2 [0; 1]: If b = 0, there are no informational externalities. The random
variables Xi are distributed on [0; 1] with distribution function F (x) = xa; with a > 0: The loss function
is:
`(p) =
p1+r
1 + r
;
We can interpret r = p`00=`0 as a coe¢ cient of relative price-risk aversion. The inverse of ` is
(z) = (1 + r)
1
1+r z
1
1+r :
I will restrict attention to the second-price auction and the case of two rounds, K = 2. In Appendix B, I
compute the bidding functions, the expected price in round 2 conditional on the rst-round price P1; and
the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the rst-round price.
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In all computations reported in this section, I will set r = 2, a commonly used value for relative risk
aversion in computational macroeconomics (e.g., see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000); it implies that a bidder
is willing to pay a price about 1% higher to avoid a 50-50 gamble of a 10% increase or a 10% decrease in
price. The results do not seem overly sensitive to the value of r.
Assume rst that there are no informational externalities, that is b = 0. Figure 1 displays the price
ratio E [P2jP1] =P1 as a function of A = a(N   2):
Fig. 1: Price ratio with no informational externalities as a function of A = a(N   2)
The average price ratio in the data in Table 1 ranges from 0:9663 to 0:9943, which correspond to values of
A from 1:3903 to 3:9788. In most of the auctions considered the number of bidders was relatively small,
typically well below 20. If we take N = 10, this gives values of a between 0:1738 and 0:4973 as those
consistent with the data.
Suppose now that there are informational externalities, b > 0: Lower values of the parameter a are
needed to match the data. Setting r = 2 as before, N = 10, and a = 0:1 yields the relationship between
the price ratio and the informational externality parameter b shown in Figure 2. The range of the average
price ratio in the data in Table 1 corresponds to values of the informational externality parameter between
0:0827 and 0:1260. Prices may decline even if there are informational externalities. In fact, the presence
of both aversion to price risk and informational externalities could help explaining why in some auctions
prices decline and in other they increase; it could also help explaining why in some multiple round auctions
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prices decline between some rounds and increase between other rounds (e.g., see Jones et al. 2004).
Fig. 2: Price ratio as a function of the information externality parameter b
8 Extensions
In this section, rst I show that the aversion to price risk e¤ect is present even when the auction format
is an oral ascending auction. Then I study sequential second-price auctions in which the winning price is
announced.
8.1 The English Auction
Sequential auctions are often run using an English, or oral ascending, format. The most commonly used
model to study a static, single unit, English auction is the so-called Japanese version, in which a price clock
moves continuously and bidders can only decide when to quit. Once a bidder quits, he cannot re-enter.
When the second to last bidder quits, the clock stops and the last bidder standing wins at the current clock
price. Using the Japanese format for sequential auctions is problematic. As Milgrom and Weber (1982)
rst pointed out, the equilibrium is the same as in the static English auction for multiple items. This is
because the Japanese format forces all losing bidders to reveal their types during the rst round and hence
eliminates all uncertainty from future rounds.
Such a counterintuitive conclusion is a by-product of the extreme nature of the Japanese format. In
practical ascending auctions, it is not the case that at the end of the rst round all bidders in the room
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know the identity of all future winners and the types of all losing bidders. Bidders often stay silent at
the beginning and only start bidding towards the end of a round. Some bidders stay silent throughout a
round. To deal with these issues in a static, single-unit environment, Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) have
introduced an Alternating Recognition (AR) model of the English auction, which better ts practice in
many auctions.
I will use a two-round version of the AR English auction and will assume that there are no informational
externalities, so that V (xi; x i) = xi. Bidders are averse to price risk and have unit demand. In each round
of the auction, the price moves up continuously as in the Japanese format. The di¤erence is that at each
point in time there are only two active bidders. At the beginning of each round, the auctioneer selects
randomly (with uniform probability) from the pool of bidders who have not yet won an object and asks
them sequentially to be active. Bidders can accept or reject to enter (be active). The clock starts after
two bidders enters. Each active bidder decides when to exit. When a bidder exits, the clock stops and the
auctioneer randomly selects from the pool of non active bidders in search for a replacement. The round
ends when only one bidder is active and all others have exited or refused to enter. The standing active
bidder wins an object at the current clock price. Bidders observe all decisions to accept to be active and
to exit.
In the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix C), I will construct a monotone equilibrium in
which in each round k the price Ek below which a bidder is willing to enter and at which he will exit when
active is an increasing function of his type x: In such an equilibrium, the rst-round exit price reveals a
bidders type and a bidder rejects to be active if and only if a higher type has already exited.
Proposition 6 There is an equilibrium of the two-round, AR English auction, with no informational
externalities, in which: (1) In the second round, bidder i of type x accepts to enter when the current clock
price is below E2 (x) = (x); if active, bidder i exits at price (x): (2) In the rst round, let M  N   2
be the number of bidders that have either exited or rejected to be active and y(M)1 the highest type among
them (if M = 0, let y(0)1 < x): Bidder i of type x accepts to be active when x > y
(M)
1 and exits when the
clock price reaches
E1 (x;M;y
(M)
1 ) = 

E
h
max
n
Y
(N 1 M)
2 ; Y
(M)
1
o
jY (N 1 M)1 = x; Y (M)1 = y(M)1
i
: (6)
AfterM bidders have exited in the rst round, max
n
Y
(N 1 M)
2 ; Y
(M)
1
o
is the type of bidder is closest
competitor. Thus, in the AR English auction with private values, after M bidders have exited the rst
round, the bid loss of bidder i with signal x is equal to the expected value of the item to his closest
competitor conditional on the highest type of the M bidders that have exited and on bidder i being
pivotal.9
9Since active bidders have higher types than the bidders that have exited, when M  N   2 ; it is Y (N 1 M)1 > y(M)1 :
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The winners of the auction are the two highest valuation bidders. There are two possible outcomes.
First, all bidders become active in the rst round. In this case, the types of all losing bidders be-
come known by the end of the rst round; the prices in the rst and in the second round are the
same and equal to (Y (N)3 ). This is the same outcome that would obtain in the rst round of the
Japanese auction, but it can only happen if either the highest or the second highest bidder are se-
lected to be active after the other N   2 bidders have already exited. The second possible outcome is
that the two highest bidders (say with types x1 and x2 < x1) are active together in the rst round
when only M < N   2 of the other bidders have already exited. In this case the rst round price is
P1 = 
E
1 (x2;M;y
(M)
1 ). The second round price is random; its expectation, conditional on P1, M and
y
(M)
1 is E
h


max
n
Y
(N 1 M)
2 ; Y
(M)
1
o
jY (N 1 M)1 = x2; Y (M)1 = y(M)1
i
, which is less than P1 by Jensens
inequality. Since the second outcome will occur with strictly positive probability, we have proved the
following proposition.
Proposition 7 With strictly positive probability, the expected price in round 2 of the two-round AR English
auction with no informational externalities, conditional on the price and bid history in round 1, is lower
than the price in round 1.
8.2 Announcing the Winning Prices in a Sequential Second-Price Auction
A delicate issue in sequential auctions is what information is revealed from round to round. The natural
candidate is to reveal the winning price in each round. Unlike in a rst-price auction, however, announcing
the winning price in a second-price auction amounts to revealing the type of the highest loser, a bidder who
will be present in the next round. As a consequence, existence of an equilibrium with increasing bidding
functions is problematic.
I will now show that in the case of no informational externalities increasing equilibrium bidding functions
exist and are the same as under the policy of revealing the bid of the winner.
Proposition 8 When there are no informational externalities, V (xi; x i) = xi; on the equilibrium path of
the symmetric equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with announcement of the winning prices,
the bidding functions can be written as
S2pk (x) = 

E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = x
i
:
This proposition, whose proof is in Appendix C, can be understood as follows. Without informational
externalities, equilibrium bids do not depend on the past history of bids, no matter whether the winning
bids, or the winning prices, are announced. In both cases, in the last round it is a dominant strategy to
place a bid-loss equal to the items value. The bids in earlier rounds are then determined recursively, via
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the indi¤erence condition (23). History does not matter because in each round k a bidder bids as if he
were pivotal (i.e., as if Y (N 1)k = x):
When, on the other hand, there are informational externalities and the winning price is revealed in
each round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does
not exist. The reason is simple: a bidder who, based on the history of prices, knows that he will lose in
round k, but will almost certainly win in round k + 1, has an incentive to deviate and make a very low
bid in round k. By doing so he will avoid being the price setter in round k: The price setter in round k
will be a bidder with a lower type, and hence in round k + 1 all other bidders (including the future price
setter) will have lower estimates of an objects conditional value and will make lower bids. As a result, the
deviating bidder will prot by winning at a lower price in round k + 1. This is made clear by Example 1
in Appendix C.
9 Conclusions
The classic model of risk neutral bidders assumes additive separability in a bidders preferences over objects
and money. The special case of risk averse bidders that I have studied in this paper maintains additive
separability, but postulates that a bidder prefers a certain price to an equivalent (on average) random price.
Additive separability of preferences makes the model very tractable. As I show in Lemma 1 in Appendix
A, it implies that bidder-payo¤ equivalence holds: All auction mechanisms with the same allocation rule
and which give the same payo¤ to the lowest bidder type are bidder-payo¤ equivalent.
Without additive separability, the e¤ects due to risk aversion and private information interact in a
complex way; for example, as shown by Maskin and Riley (1984), a risk neutral auctioneer choosing an
optimal mechanism will not want to fully insure bidders. The simple model of aversion to price risk I
studied in this paper, on the other hand, is very tractable. As a result, it yields a simple explanation of
declining prices in sequential auctions. In e¤ect, declining prices allow the bidder to insure himself in the
current round against next round price randomness.
The paper also uncovers an informational externality e¤ect. When there is no aversion to price risk,
but there are informational externalities, prices increase between rounds of sequential auctions even when
signals are independent. In essence, optimal equilibrium behaviour leads the current price setter to under-
estimate the signal of his highest opponent, and hence next round price.
Several empirical implications can be drawn from this paper. First, the more important a concern is
price risk for bidders, the more we should expect prices to decline between rounds. Thus, for example, if
there is a serious possibility that new bidders may enter in the next round, then price risk is more severe
and we should expect prices to decline more.
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Second, when informational externalities, or value interdependencies, are not very important, but
bidders are averse to price risk, then prices are likely to decline. When value interdependencies are more
important than price risk, then we should expect prices to increase between rounds. For example, if the
auctioneer publishes all the information at his disposal (as the professional auction houses typically do),
including value estimates of the objects for sale, then interdependencies are reduced and it is more likely
that we see prices decline (as the data broadly suggests), rather than increase between rounds. If bidders
are professionals, buying the goods for resale, and little information is provided about resale value by the
auctioneer before the auction, then it is more likely that prices will increase between rounds.10
Third, the less information about biddersvalues transpires during a round, the more we should expect
prices to decline. Thus, if each round is an oral ascending auction, the larger the number of bidders that
remain silent during the initial rounds, the higher future price randomness, and hence the more likely are
prices to decline between rounds.
More generally, the interaction between the aversion to price risk e¤ect and the informational externality
e¤ect could help to explain the complex price paths we sometimes observe in the data.
10This seems broadly consistent with Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2005) study of an auction of rare library books, in which
price estimates were not published and a lower bound on the number of professionals in the auction is estimated by the authors
at about 25%.
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Appendix A
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. First, it is it is useful to derive a lemma showing
that bidderspayo¤s are the same in every auction having the same outcome function and yielding the
same payo¤ to the lowest type of bidder.
Suppose that k objects have already been sold to the k highest type bidders, y1; :::; yk; suppose also
that the winnerstypes have been revealed. Consider a mechanism in which k+1(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) is is
probability of winning one of the remaining objects and pk+1(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) is is payment when he
behaves as a type x0: Then, bidder is expected payo¤ when his type is x; but he behaves as if his type
were x0 is
Uk+1(x
0;x; yk; :::; y1) =
Z yk
x
:::
Z yN 2
x

V (x; yN 1; :::; y1)i(x0; yN 1; :::; yk+1) 
`(pi(x
0
i; yN 1; :::; yk+1))

f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jY (N 1)k = yk)dyN 1:::dyk+1;
where f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jyk) is the density of the order statistics Y (N 1)N 1 ; :::; Y (N 1)k+1 conditional on Y (N 1)k =
yk. (By independence, it is not necessary to condition on the order statistics Y
(N 1)
h with h < k:)
Letting Uk+1(x; yk; :::; y1) = Uk+1(x;x; yk; :::; y1) be the expected payo¤ in equilibrium of type x, and
using a standard envelope argument yields
@Uk+1(x; yk; :::; y1)
@x
(7)
=
Z yk
x
:::
Z yN 2
x
@V (x; yN 1; :::; y1)
@x
i(x; yN 1; :::; yk+1)f(yN 1; :::; yk+1jY (N 1)k = yk)dyN 1:::dyk+1:
Denote the distribution and density function of the order statistic Y (n)j as F
(n)
j and f
(n)
j : If the mech-
anism is e¢ cient, as the sequential auctions studied in this paper, then (7) becomes
@Uk+1(x; yk; ::; y1)
@x
= E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; yk; ::; y1)
@x
x > Y (N 1)K
#
F
(N 1)
K (xjY (N 1)k = yk): (8)
Equation (7), combined with Uk+1(x; :::) = u, yields the bidder-payo¤ equivalence lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose k < K objects have already been sold to the highest type bidders, and the winning
types have been announced. Bidderspayo¤s are the same in any mechanism hk+1; pk+1i having the same
outcome function k+1 and yielding the same payo¤ to the lowest type. Equation (7) (equation (8) if the
mechanism is e¢ cient) and the boundary condition Uk+1(x; :::) = u determine a bidders payo¤.
We are now ready to prove propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S1k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Recall that,
assuming that S1k is increasing in x; on the equilibrium path the true types of the winning bidders are
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revealed. Suppose that if the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all
bidders believes that the winning bidders type is the same as the type of the previous rounds winner;
if the observed winning bid in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the
winners type is the lowest possible type.
Let Uk (x; yk 1; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder in the continuation equilibrium be-
ginning in round k (i.e., the payo¤ conditional on having lost all previous auctions and on the history up
to round k). In writing a bidders payo¤, I will use the function vk, dened in (2). Suppose that all the
other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating in round k (only).
First note that, given his beliefs, it is not protable for bidder i to bid above the highest possible bid of
the other bidders S1k (yk 1; ). Bidding below the lowest possible bid is equivalent to bidding the lowest
bid; in both cases winning is a zero probability event. Hence if there is a protable deviation, there is a
protable deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. The payo¤ of bidder i of type x when he bids
b = S1k (z; yk 1; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in round k is:
Uk(z;x; yk 1; :::) =
Z z
x

vk(x; yk; :::)  `(S1k (z; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk (9)
+
Z x
z
Uk+1(x; yk; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the rst order condition
vk(x; z; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (z; yk 1; :::))F
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dz
(10)
  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Since on the equilibrium path it is x  yk 1; and z = x must be optimal, we obtain the following necessary
condition for equilibrium:
vk(x; x; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (x; yk 1; ::))F
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dx
(11)
  Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Observe that if the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal
x wins with probability 1; hence, it is
Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; x; yk 1; :::)  `(S1k+1(x;x; yk 1; :::)): (12)
Since UK+1(x;x; yK 1; ::; ) = 0; equation (12) also holds for k = K, provided we dene
S1K+1(x;x; yK 1; :::) =  (vK(x; x; yK 1; :::)) : (13)
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Using (12), equation (11) can be written as
`(S1k+1(x;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

 
d

`(S1k (x; ))F (N 1)k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dx
= 0: (14)
Integrating (14) we obtain
`(S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1)) =
Z x
x
`
 
S1k+1(ex; ex; yk 1; ::; y1) f (N 1)k
exjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
F
(N 1)
k

xjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
dex (15)
= E
h
`

S1k+1(Y
(N 1)
k ;Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)

jY (N 1)k  x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1
i
:
By (13), for k = K, this yields
`(S1K (x; yK 1; :::)) = E
h
vK(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
K ; yK 1; :::)jY (N 1)K  x  yK 1
i
:
Working backwards, (15) yields
`
 
S1k (x; yk 1; :::)

= E
h
vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1
i
;
and hence on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy
S1k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) = 

E
h
vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

jY (N 1)k  x  yk 1
i
: (16)
Note from (16) that if values are private vk

Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::

= V

Y
(N 1)
K

, and S1k is
independent of y1; :::; yk 1.
It remains to show that the rst order condition (11) is a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium. Using
(11) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (10) we obtain
@Uk
@z
= [vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)] f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(17)
+

Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

:
Since vk is increasing in x and UK+1 = 0; for k = K the sign of
@Uk
@z is the same as x   z; hence z = x is
optimal.
Now suppose k < K; take rst the case z  x. Note that
Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  `(S1k+1(z; z; yk 1; :::));
because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k, and bids S1k+1(minfx; zg; z; yk 1; :::) = S1k+1(z; z; yk 1; :::):
It follows that @Uk@z = 0 for z  x and bidder i has no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in
round k.
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Now suppose that z > x. By Lemma 1, equation (8), we have
@Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
= E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
x > Y (N 1)K
#
F
(N 1)
K (xjY (N 1)k = z)
< E
"
@V (x; Y
(N 1)
N 1 ; ::; Y
(N 1)
k+1 ; z; yk 1; ::; y1)
@x
#
=
@vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)
@x
: (18)
Integrating between x and z, it follows that
Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) < vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(x; z; yk 1; :::);
and hence that @Uk@z < 0 for z > x; bidder i has no incentive to bid more than the equilibrium strategy in
round k. This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let S2k (x; yk 1; :::; y1) be round k equilibrium bidding function. Suppose that
if the winning bid in round k is higher than the highest equilibrium bid, then all bidders believe that the
winning bidders type is the same as the type of the previous rounds winner; if the observed winning bid
in round k is below the lowest equilibrium bid, then bidders believe that the winners type is the lowest
possible type.
Let Uk (x; yk 1; :::) be the expected payo¤ for a type x of bidder at the beginning of round k. Suppose
that all the other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies, while bidder i is considering deviating in round
k. As for the case of a sequential rst-price auction, if there is a protable deviation, there is a protable
deviation with a bid in the range of possible bids. Recalling (2), the payo¤ of bidder i of type x when he
bids b = S2k (z; yk 1; :::) (i.e., he bids like a type z) in auction k can be written as:
Uk(z;x; yk 1; :::) =
Z z
x

vk(x; yk; :::)  `(S2k (yk; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk
+
Z x
z
Uk+1(x; yk; yk 1; ::)f
(N 1)
k

ykjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

dyk:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields the rst order condition

vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  `(S2k (z; yk 1; :::))

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(19)
  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; )f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

= 0:
Since on the equilibrium path z = x must be optimal, the following is a necessary condition for equilibrium:
vk(x; x; yk 1; :::)  `(S2k (x; yk 1; :::))  Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = 0: (20)
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If k = K; then Uk+1(x; ) = 0, and (20) yields that on the equilibrium path the bidding function must
satisfy
S2K (x; yK 1; :::; y1) =  (vK(x; x; yK 1; :::; y1)) : (21)
If the signal of the winner in round k < K is x, then in round k + 1 bidder i with signal x wins with
probability 1; hence, it is
Uk+1(x;x; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; x; yk 1; :::) 
Z x
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = x

: (22)
Thus (20) can be written as
`(S2k (x; yk 1; :::)) =
Z x
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1;x; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = x

(23)
= E
h
`(S2k+1(Y
(N 1)
k+1 ;Y
(N 1)
k ; :::))jY (N 1)k = x  Y (N 1)k 1 = yk 1; :::
i
:
Recalling (21) and working backwards we obtain
`(S2k (x; yk 1; :::)) = E
h
vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; x; yk 1)
i
:
Thus, we have shown that on the equilibrium path the bidding function must satisfy
S2k (x; yk 1; ::; y1) = 

E
h
vk(Y
(N 1)
K ; Y
(N 1)
k ; yk 1; :::)jY (N 1)k = x
i
: (24)
It remains to show that the rst order condition (20) is a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium. Using
(20) to replace the second term on the left hand side of equation (19) we obtain
@Uk
@z
= [vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)] f (N 1)k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

(25)
+

Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; :::)

f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k 1 = yk 1

:
Consider k = K; since vk is increasing in x and UK+1 = 0; the sign of
@UK
@z is the same as x  z; hence
z = x is optimal.
Now suppose k < K; take rst the case z  x. Note that
Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; ) = vk(x; z; yk 1; :::) 
Z z
x
`(S2k+1(yk+1; z; yk 1; :::))f
(N 1)
k+1

yk+1jY (N 1)k = z

;
because in this case bidder i wins for sure in round k: It follows that @Uk@z = 0 for z  x and bidder i has
no incentive to bid less than the equilibrium strategy in round k.
Now take the case z > x. As shown in (18), by Lemma 1 we have
@Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; :::; y1)
@x
<
@vk(x; z; yk 1; :::)
@x
:
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Integrating between x and z, it follows that
vk(z; z; yk 1; :::)  vk(x; z; yk 1; :::) > Uk+1(z; z; yk 1; ::; )  Uk+1(x; z; yk 1; ::; );
and hence that @Uk@z < 0 for z > x; bidder i has no incentive to bid more than the equilibrium strategy in
round k. This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Appendix B
In this appendix, I compute the bidding functions and price ratios for the example discussed in Section 7.
Recalling that
(z) = (1 + r)
1
1+r z
1
1+r ;
we can use Proposition 2 to calculate the bidding functions in the sequential second-price auction:
S22 (x; y1) = (1 + r)
1
1+r

by1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

x
 1
1+r
;
S21 (x) = (1 + r)
1
1+r

a (N   2)
a (N   2) + 1x+ b

x+ (N   2) a
a+ 1
x
 1
1+r
:
The expected price in round 2, conditional on the rst-round price P1 is:
E

P2jP1 = S21 (x)

= (1 + r)
1
1+r E
"
b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
1  xa +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

Y
(N 1)
2
 1
1+r
jY (N 1)2  x
#
= (1 + r)
1
1+r
Z x
0

b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
1  xa +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)z
a(N 2) 1
xa(N 2)
dz
= (1 + r)
1
1+r x
1
1+r
Z 1
0

b
a
a+ 1
1  xa+1
x  xa+1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) a
a+ 1
b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz:
It follows that the ratio of the conditional expected second-round price to the rst-round price is:
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
R 1
0

b aa+1
1 xa+1
x xa+1 +

1 + b+ (N   3) aa+1b

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1 + b

1 + (N   2) aa+1
 1
1+r
: (26)
In the case of no informational externalities, that is b = 0, this becomes:
E [P2jP1]
P1
=
R 1
0 z
1
1+r a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1
 1
1+r
=
(a(N   2)) r1+r (a (N   2) + 1) 11+r
a(N   2) + 11+r
 : (27)
If there are informational externalities, b > 0; E[P2jP1]P1 depends on the signal x of the rst-round price
setter. Since x is the value of the second order statistic out of N draws, the expected value of the price
ratio is
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E
E [P2jP1]
P1

=
Z 1
0
R 1
0

b aa+1
1 xa+1
x xa+1 +

1 + ba+1 (1 + (N   2)a)

z
 1
1+r
a(N   2)za(N 2) 1dz
a(N 2)
a(N 2)+1 + b

1 + (N   2) aa+1
 1
1+r
N(N   1)a (1  xa)xa(N 1) 1dx:
Appendix C
In this appendix, I prove the propositions for the sequential AR English auction and the sequential second-
price auction with announcement of the winning prices presented in Section 8. I also present Example
1, which shows that when there are informational externalities and the winning price is revealed in each
round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does not
exist. I start with the AR English auction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Given that values are private, in the second round it is a weakly dominant
strategy for a type x bidder to enter when called and to stay in if the current price is below the implicit
price associated with x: Hence E2 (x) = (x) and bidding behaviour in the second round does not depend
on the information revealed in the rst round.11 Let E1 (x;M;y
(M)
1 ) be the rst round exit price (bid) of
an active bidder i of type x  y(M)1 when M other bidders have either exited or rejected a call to be active
and y(M)1 is the highest type among them. (This type is revealed by the bidding behaviour if all bidders
in M follow the equilibrium bidding strategy.) Let f (N 2 M)1;2 (y; w) be the joint density of the rst and
second order statistic out of N   2 M bidders. The payo¤ of a type x active bidder who behaves like a
type z when M bidders have already exited is the following
Uk(z;x;M; y
(M)
1 ) =
Z z
y
(M)
1
Z yA
0
h
x  `

1

yA;M;y
(M)
1
i
f
(N 2 M)
1 (y) f

yAjyA  y(M)1

dydyA
+
Z x
y
(M)
1
Z 1
yA
Z yA
0
[x  yA] f (N 2 M)1;2 (y; w) f

yAjyA  y(M)1

dwdydyA
+
Z 1
z
Z minfx;yAg
y
(M)
1
[x  y] f (N 2 M)1 (y) f

yAjyA  y(M)1

dydyA
+
Z 1
z
Z y(M)1
0
h
x  y(M)1
i
f
(N 2 M)
1 (y) f

yAjyA  y(M)1

dydyA:
11Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) showed that the equilibrium of the single-item AR English auction with risk neutral bidders
di¤ers from the equilibrium of the second-price auction when types are a¢ liated and there are informational externalities.
Their equilibrium reduces to the equilibrium of the second-price auction when there are independent private values.
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Di¤erentiating with respect to z we obtainZ z
0
h
x  `

1

z;M;y
(M)
1
i
f
(N 2 M)
1 (y) f

zjz  y(M)1

dy
 
Z minfx;zg
y
(M)
1
[x  y] f (N 2 M)1 (y) f

zjz  y(M)1

dy (28)
 
Z y(M)1
0
h
x  y(M)1
i
f
(N 2 M)
1 (y) f

zjz  y(M)1

dy:
Equating to zero, setting z = x (as it must be in equilibrium) and simplifying yields
0 =
Z x
0
h
max
n
y; y
(M)
1
o
  `

1

x;M;y
(M)
1
i
f
(N 2 M)
1 (y) dy;
which can be written as
1

x;M;y
(M)
1

= 
 Z x
0
max
n
y; y
(M)
1
o f (N 2 M)1 (y)
F
(N 2 M)
1 (x)
dy
!
= 

E
h
max
n
Y
(N 1 M)
2 ; Y
(M)
1
o
jY (N 1 M)1 = x;Y (M)1 = y(M)1
i
Using this formula, we can see that (28) is zero for z  x and negative for z > x. This concludes the proof
of the proposition. 
Now consider the sequential second-price auction with announcement of the winning prices.
Proof of Proposition 8. As in a static second-price auction, it is clear that in round K bidding according
to the equilibrium strategy is a weakly dominant strategy; a bidder wins if and only if he obtains a positive
payo¤ and the price he pays does not depend on his bid.
Now consider round k < K; suppose that all the other bidders follow their equilibrium strategies, as
described in the proposition, while bidder i is considering deviating. Suppose rst that bidder i of type
x is the price setter in round k   1 and hence the bidder with the k-th highest signal (this implies that
the k-th highest signal among his N   1 opponents is less than, or equal to, x). Note rst that bidding as
a type z > x yields the same payo¤ as bidding as a type x (he wins for sure). If he deviates in round k
(only) and bids as if he were a type z  x, he either wins in round k, or in round k+1; he obtains a payo¤
x 
Z z
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = y
i
f
(N 1)
k

yjY (N 1)k  x

dy
 
Z x
z
Z y
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k+1 = t
i
f
(N 1)
k+1

tjY (N 1)k = y

dtf
(N 1)
k

yjY (N 1)k  x

dy:
Di¤erentiating with respect to z yields
  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = z
i
f
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k  x

+
Z z
x
E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k+1 = t
i
f
(N 1)
k+1

tjY (N 1)k = z

dtf
(N 1)
k

zjY (N 1)k  x

;
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which is equal to zero for all values of z. It follows that type x has no incentive to deviate in round k.
Now consider a type x < yk, the price setter in round k   1: If in round k he bids as if he were a type
z < yk, then he loses and obtains the same (expected, future) payo¤ independently of his bid. It follows
that he may as well bid as a type x; by equation (8), doing so gives him the (equilibrium) payo¤n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
; (29)
where Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
is the probability that Y (N 1)K < x conditional on Y
(N 1)
k = yk: If
type x bids in round k as if he were a type z = yk; then he ties with the round k winner and he may as
well raise his bid and win for sure, or lower his bid and lose for sure. If he bids above the bid of the yk
type, so that he wins for sure, type x obtains a payo¤
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)k = yk
i
=
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
+
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K  x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K  xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
<
n
x  E
h
Y
(N 1)
K jY (N 1)K < x; Y (N 1)k = yk
io
Pr
h
Y
(N 1)
K < xjY (N 1)k = yk
i
:
It follows from (29) that it is not protable for a bidder of type x to deviate and bid more than a type yk.
This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
The next example shows that with informational externalities and the winning price being revealed in
each round, an equilibrium of the sequential second-price auction with an increasing bidding function does
not exist.
Example 1
There are four bidders, three objects, and the common quality of an object is V = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4.
Without loss of generality, let x1 > x2 > x3 > x4 (bidders, of course, only know their own signals). Suppose
there exists an increasing equilibrium. Then bidder 1 wins the rst round and announcing the price reveals
x2, the signal of bidder 2. Suppose x3 = x2   ", with " arbitrarily small. At the beginning of the
second round, bidder 3 knows that if he bids according to the equilibrium strategy, then with probability
arbitrarily closeto 1 he will be the price setter in round 2 and win an object in round 3. The price he
will pay in round 3 is the bid of bidder 4. Since this is the last round, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
bidder 4 to bid b =  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + x3 + x4) (recall that x2 and x3 have been revealed by the price
announcements, but x1 has not). Now consider a deviation by bidder 3 in round 2; suppose he bids zero.
Then the price setter in round 2 is bidder 4 and his signal is revealed. In round 3 bidder 4s weakly dominant
bid is bb =  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + 2x4), since bidder 4 assumes he is pivotal; that is, he assumes x3 = x4.
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After having deviated in round 2, in round 3 bidder 3s weakly dominant strategy is to use a bid-loss equal
to the conditional expected value of the object; that is, he will bid  (E[X1jX1  x2] + x2 + x3 + x4). It
follows that by deviating bidder 3 will win in the third round and pay a price bb which is less than the price
b he would pay if he followed the equilibrium strategy. Hence we have a contradiction; bidder 3 of type
x3 = x2   " has a protable deviation in round 2 from the supposed increasing equilibrium.
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